Aristotle on megalopsychia (μεγαλοψυχια)

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Aristotle’s account of megalopsychia or greatness of soul centers upon extraordinary virtue. Aristotle situates megalopsychia in the category of virtues of character, that is, those virtues which arise out of habituation. For Aristotle, human happiness “is equivalent to living well and acting well” (nei, 4; 1095a).7The human good entails, precisely, activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (nei, 7; 1098a). Aristotle’s ethics combine a universal standard (virtue consists in the mean between excess and deficiency) with the relative aspect of the circumstances of each moral agent. Aristotle summarizes his basic structure of virtues in this way: “Virtue, then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us, and determined by reason – the reason, that is, by reference to which the practically wise person would determine it” (neii, 6; 1107a). Any human being can become angry or spend money, but doing such things “in relation to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the right way – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy…[t]his is why excellence in these things is rare, praiseworthy, and noble (καλον)” (neii, 9; 1109a). The magnanimous or great-souled individual, who excels in all virtue, is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.

For Aristotle, greatness of soul or magnanimity (megalopsychia) implies virtue on a grand scale (neiv, 3; 1123a32). He writes, “A person is thought to be great-souled, if he thinks himself worthy of great things – and is indeed worthy of them” (neiv, 3; 1123b1). The great-souled person is extreme as virtue itself is an extreme. However, magnanimity is a mean between the excess of vanity—claiming honor when one is not worthy of it—and the deficiency of smallness of soul (micropsychia), that is, not claiming the honor one is due (neiv, 3; 1123b12–15). Aristotle then moves quickly through the syllogisms of his portrait of the magnanimous person. Since worth (axios) is concerned with external goods and honor is the greatest external good because it is rendered upon the gods, the great-souled person is concerned with honor and dishonor in the right way (neiv, 3; 1123b23). Then Aristotle makes a remarkable statement, as grand as the concept that he is presenting: “The great-souled person, since he is worthy of the greatest things [honor], must be the best person of all” (neiv, 3; 1123b27–29). The magnanimous person demonstrates greatness in every virtue, and so, magnanimity represents a sort of crown or ornament of the virtues (kosmos tis einai ton areton).

Aristotle completes his portrait by delineating various attributes of the magnanimous person. In all things, the great-souled person is superior, dignified, calm, self aware (neiv, 3; 1124b5), courageous, does not complain, and is slow to act but for matters involving great honor or significance (neiv, 3; 1124b24–25). The magnanimous person is isolated from his fellow men and women by his bearing. The excellence of his virtue is so extraordinary that it prevents him from interacting on equal terms with anyone but his peers in virtue—who are few. The magnanimous person is motivated by great honor and dismissive of unimportant honors conferred by inconsequential people (neiv, 3; 1124a10–11). Lastly, though a person of wealth and noble bearing, the great-souled individual is not excessively distressed or moved by loss of wealth, power, and good or bad fortune (neiv, 3; 1124a14–15). Virtue, honor, and self-awareness insulate the magnanimous person from most of what individuals of lesser virtue endure in their daily lives.

Many modern scholars criticize Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity—the supersized instance of virtue in an individual—for two reasons. First, the magnanimous man seems to present a problem for Aristotle’s system in which agents act in accord with virtue for the sake of the summum bonum itself: human activity in accord with virtue.8 Second, in Aristotle’s portrait, though he has a legitimate claim on great honor, the great-souled man appears to be eminently aristocratic, aloof, and self-absorbed because of his concern for the greatest honors. The great-souled person seems to disdain or ignore anything or anyone beneath his concern (Eudemian Ethicsiii, 5; 1232b4–7).9 Yet, there are other instances in the Aristotelian corpus where megalopsychia is related to offices within the polis because great offices represent opportunities for great honor (eeiii, 5; 1232b22–24). At times, civic positions of great power are worthy of pursuit because they offer the opportunity to engage in greater works that garner even greater honor.